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"FOREVER SEPARATE AND DISTINCT":
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN NORTH
CAROLINA
BY JOHN V. ORTHt
In 1982 the North Carolina Supreme Court issued two opinions
dealing with separation ofpowers in North Carolina state government.
These opinions limit the power of the legislature to appoint its own
members to agencies within the executive branch, and restrict the ability
of the legislature to delegate legislativefunctions to a group of its mem-
bers or to interfere with the budgetary management authority of the
executive. Professor Orth challenges the basis for these opinions, ex-
amines considerations not addressed by the court, and suggests that the
ultimate explanation may lie in public policy concerns. He concludes
that public policy may not be served best by the results.
The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State
government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.
North Carolina Constitution, Art. 1, § 6
Separation of powers is one of the fundamental principles of American
constitutionalism on both the federal and state levels. Legislative, executive,
and judicial powers are allocated to branches of government independent of
each other. The purpose of this separation is the better preservation of the
liberty of the citizen. To be effective, government must be endowed with vari-
ous powers, but every power is subject to abuse. To limit the risk of abuse, the
necessary powers of government are divided among three branches. Further-
more, the separation of powers is so contrived that in many cases one power
restrains the abuse of another. The principle of restraining one power with
another is known as checks and balances; it, too, is one of the fundamental
principles of American constitutionalism.
Although separation of powers and the related principle of checks and
balances underlie American constitutions, they have rarely figured as such in
the important constitutional decisions rendered by American courts. Specific
constitutional or statutory provisions have been most often at issue.' In early
1982, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided a case expressly
t Associate Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B. 1969, Oberlin;
J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard.
1. See, e.g., Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 420 (9th Cir.
1980), qft'd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). Although the court of appeals invalidated a federal statute on
the ground that it violated separation of powers, it admitted that it had found no prior case hold-
ing that "the Legislature has impermissibly invaded the prerogative of the Executive or the Judici-
ary absent a clause in the [Federal] Constitution which confers the power upon another branch
with great specificity." Id. at 420.
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concerned with separation of powers in state government, State ex rel Wallace
v. Bone.2 A month later, the Justices issuedAdvisory Opinion in re Separation
of Powers,3 which reaffirmed Wallace.
This Article examines the legal arguments relied on in Wallace and the
advisory opinion. Finding those arguments unpersuasive or incomplete, it re-
views other considerations not mentioned by the court and observes that im-
portant questions concerning the appointments power remain unanswered. It
suggests that the judicial pronouncements on separation of powers may be
better explained in terms of public policy rather than legal arguments, but it
questions whether public policy is well served by the results.
I. STATE EX BEL. WALLACE V. BONE
Wallace was serving as a member of the State Environmental Manage-
ment Commission (EMC)4 by appointment of the Governor. 5 In 1980 the
General Assembly increased the membership of the EMC from thirteen to
seventeen and provided that, of the four additional members, two shall be
members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the
House and two shall be members of the Senate appointed by the President of
the Senate. 6 Wallace and another member of the EMC who also had been
appointed by the Governor instituted an action in the nature of quo warranto7
against Representative Bone and another who were appointed to the EMC by
the Speaker. At the same time, two other members of the EMC appointed by
the Governor brought an action for declaratory judgment against all four leg-
islators appointed to the EMC. The issue presented by the actions, which were
consolidated for trial and disposition, was whether the membership of defend-
ants in the EMC at the same time they were serving in the legislature violated
the separation of powers clause of the state constitution. The trial judge held
2. 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982).
3. 305 N.C. 767, 295 S.E.2d 589 (1982).
4. The EMC was created in 1974. Reorganization of State Government Act, ch. 1262, § 19,
1973 N.C. Sess. Laws (2d Sess.) 380 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-282 (1983)).
5. As originally constituted, the EMC had thirteen members appointed by the Governor
from groups with certain vocational qualifications. Reorganization of State Government Act, ch.
1262, § 20, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws (2d Sess.) 381 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-283(a)
(1978)).
6. Act Relating to the Authority of the Environmental Management Commission, ch, 1158,
§ 6, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws (2d Sess.) 92 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-283(d) (1983))
(amended 1983 to provide that "the General Assembly shall appoint four members, two upon the
recommendation of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and two upon the recommenda-
tion of the President of the Senate").
7. The royal writ quo warranto (by what warrant) was used in the Middle Ages to test
claimed rights, especially to jurisdiction. D. SUTHERLAND, QUo WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS IN
THE REIGN OF EDWARD 1, 1278-1294 (1963). In the sixteenth century the writ was replaced by an
information filed by the attorney general. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 229-
30 (7th ed. 1956). The writ of quo warranto and proceedings by information in the nature of quo
warranto are abolished in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 1-514 (1969). Nonetheless, the
action of quo warranto is still spoken of, although in fact what is involved is a civil action to try
title to an office. Before a private person may bring such an action, he must secure leave from the
Attorney General by providing satisfactory security to indemnify the state against all expenses
accruing in consequence of the action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-516 (1969).
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that it did not, placing emphasis on the "clear minority position of the legisla-
tors on the Commission."8 Reversing the judgment below, the North Carolina
Supreme Court9 unanimously held that the General Assembly lacks the con-
stitutional authority to mandate the appointment of legislators to bodies in the
executive branch. 10
In reaching its decision, the court announced that it had considered "[1]
the history of the principle of separation of powers in our state and nation, [2]
the decisions of other jurisdictions in our nation respecting the principle, and
[3] the specific provisions of our constitution and the statutes involved."1
A. History of Separation of Powers
In its historical review, the court examined the language of the North
Carolina and Federal Constitutions in light of some contemporary expressions
of opinion. With regard to the state constitutional provision concerning sepa-
ration of powers, the court also considered judicial opinions referring to the
provision. A careful examination reveals, however, that the court's historical
argument is seriously flawed.
1. Constitutional Provisions
The principle of separation of powers has been explicitly proclaimed in
each successive North Carolina Constitution with only slight variations in
wording.' 2 The first state constitution, adopted in 1776, declared "[t]hat the
8. State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, Nos. 81CVSI191 & 81CVS1192, unpublished op. at 6
(Wake Co. Super. Ct. March 18, 1981).
9. Exercising the discretion authorized by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1981), the supreme
court had certified the case for review without a determination by the court of appeals. Wallace,
304 N.C. at 595, 286 S.E.2d at 81.
10. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 88 (1982). The court did not consider the impact
of its holding on the continued existence of the EMC. Presumably the Commission is permitted to
function as originally constituted. See supra note 5.
Nor did the court consider whether the official actions of the EMC taken during the service of
the legislative members were valid. The court had earlier held that in the absence of a legally
existing office there can be no de facto officer. Idol v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 65 S.E.2d 313 (1951).
Other courts, in similar cases, have held that officers appointed pursuant to statutes later declared
invalid were nonetheless de facto officers during their time of service. See, e.g., Book v. State
Office Bldg. Comm'n, 238 Ind. 120, 169, 149 N.E.2d 273, 298 (1958); State ex rel. Schneider v.
Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 301, 547 P.2d 786, 800 (1976). In response to the holding in Wallace major
changes were made in the operation of state government. Separation of Powers Act of 1982, ch.
1191, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg Sess.) 1982 (codified in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT.).
Further legislation may be anticipated, restoring nondelegable legislative powers to the General
Assembly and conditioning the exercise of certain executive powers on non-binding consultation
with a legislative committee, the Advisory Budget Commisssion. LEGISLArVE REsEARCH
COMM'N, SEPARATION OF POWERS: REPORT TO THE 1983 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CARO-
LINA 3-4 (1983).
11. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 595, 286 S.E.2d at 81 (numbers added).
12. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 4: "That the legislative, executive, and
supreme judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from each
other."
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 8: "The legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of
the government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other."
N.C. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 6: "The legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of
the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other."
1983]
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legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of government, ought to be
forever separate and distinct from each other." 13 In its opinion in Wallace,
the court traced this declaration to instructions from the counties to their dele-
gates to the North Carolina Provincial Congress that drafted the constitu-
tion.14 It also observed that the present constitution, adopted in 1970, not only
retains a separation of powers clause but also expressly allocates the "legisla-
tive power," the "executive power," and the "judicial power" to the respective
branches of state government.
15
The United States Constitution of 1787, although it contains no explicit
provision regarding separation of powers comparable to the North Carolina
declaration, clearly incorporates the principle. The three powers of govern-
ment are allocated to independent branches. 16 To explain the Founding Fa-
thers' fondness for separation of powers the court quoted from The Federalist:
13. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 4.
14. Instructions to the Mecklenburg County delegation included the following:
4. That you shall endeavor that the form of Government shall set forth a bill of rights
containing the rights of the people and of individuals which shall never be infringed in
any future time by the law-making power or other derived powers in the State.
5. That you shall endeavor that the following maxims be substantially acknowledged in
the Bills of Rights (viz):
1st. Political power is of two kinds, one principal and superior, the other derived and
inferior.
2nd. The principal supreme power is possessed by the people at large, the derived and
inferior power by the servants which they employ.
6. That you shall endeavor that the Government shall be so formed that the derived
inferior power shall be divided into three branches distinct from each other, viz:
The power of making laws
The power of executing laws and
The power of Judging.
9. The law making power shall be restrained in all future time from making any altera-
tion in the form of Government.
Instructions to the Orange County delegation included the following:
Fourthly. We require that in framing the civil constitution the derived inferior power
shall be divided into three branches, to wit: The power of making laws, the power of
executing and the power of judging.
Fifthly. That the power of making laws shall have authority to provide remedies for any
evils which may arise in the community, subject to the limitations and restraints pro-
vided by the principal supreme power.
Seventhly. That the executive power shall have authority to apply the remedies provided
by the law makers in that manner only which the laws shall direct, and shall be entirely
distinct from the power of making laws.
Eighthly: That the judging power shall be entirely distinct from and independent of the
law making and executive powers.
Ninthly: That no person shall be capable of acting in the exercise of any more than one of
these branches at the same time lest they shouldfall of being the proper checks on each
other and by their united influence become dangerous to any individual who might oppose
the ambitious designs of the persons who might be employed in such power.
Wallace, 304 N.C. at 596-98, 286 S.E.2d at 82-83 (quoting 10 COLONIAL RECORDs OF NORTH
CAROLINA 870a, 870b, 870g, 870h (W. Saunders ed. 1890)) (emphasis added by the Court).
For an investigation of the deeper roots of separation of powers see Sharpe, The Classical
American Doctrine of the Separation of Powers, 2 U. CHI. L. Rav. 385 (1935).
15. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 1; art. III, §1; art. IV, § 1.
16. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1.
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In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is sub-
mitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpa-
tions are guarded against, by a division of the government into
distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided be-
tween two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each
subdivided among distinct and separate departments.1
7
The court also repeated a passage from George Washington's farewell address
of 1796, warning against encroachment by one branch on the powers of
another. 18
All the citations of historical authority in Wallace support these proposi-
tions: (1) the drafters of the federal and state constitutions intended to sepa-
rate the powers of government and, (2) they expected the separated powers to
check and balance one another. Both points may be conceded. The important
question remaining, however, is this: What limit does the principle of separa-
tion of powers, in and of itself, impose on the power of the legislature?
The same author whose passage from The Federalist the court quoted in
support of separation of powers had occasion in an earlier Number to com-
ment on the actual assignment of powers in North Carolina:
If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find
that, notwithstanding the emphatical and, in some instances, the un-
qualified terms in which this axiom [separation of powers] has been
laid down, there is not a single instance in which the several depart-
ments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct...
The constitution of North Carolina, which declares "that the legisla-
tive, executive, and supreme judicial powers of government ought to
be forever separate and distinct from each other," refers, at the same
time, to the legislative department, the appointment not only of the
executive chief, but all the principal officers within both that and the
judiciary department. 19
The same constitution, in other words, that mandated separation of powers
17. 304 N.C. at 598, 286 S.E.2d 83 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 350-51 (J. Madison)
(J.Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis added by the court). The court attributed this Number of THE
FEDERALIST to Alexander Hamilton, "one of the drafters of the federal constitution and keeper of
copious notes." Id There is persuasive evidence that Number 51, was actually written by James
Madison. THE FEDERALIST xxvi-xxix (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Brant, Settling the Authorship of The
Federalist, 67 AM. HIST. Rlv. 71, 71 (1961).
18. It is important, likewise, that the habit of thinking in a free country should inspire
caution, in those intrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their
respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one depart-
ment to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the
powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of govern-
ment, a real despotism. A just estimate of the love of power, and proneness to abuse it,
which predominates in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this
position.
Wallace, 304 N.C. at 599, 286 S.E.2d at 83 (quoting Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 238 Ind.
120, 162, 149 N.E.2d 273, 294 (1958)).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 327-30 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). This Number, too,
may be attributed to Madison. Id. at xxi.
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also provided for the election by the General Assembly of the Governor, 20 the
members of the Council of State,21 the Attorney General,22 the State Treas-
urer,23 the State Secretary,24 and all the judges.25 This arrangement seems to
have conformed to the wishes of the people of North Carolina.26 With only
one modification,27 it endured for almost a century, until the upheaval of the
Civil War led to the drafting of the constitution of 1868.
Thus the court's argument based on the history of the separation of pow-
ers clause is unpersuasive. While it is clear that North Carolina's Founding
Fathers were committed to the principle of separation of powers, it is equally
clear from a reading of the entire text of the constitution of 1776 that they
failed to discern any violation of that principle in the predominance of the
legislature over the other branches of government.28
20. N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 15.
21. Id. § 16. The Council of State, composed of seven members, advised the Governor in the
execution of his office. Its consent was required before the Governor could take certain important
actions.
22. Id. § 13.
23. Id. § 22.
24. Id. § 24.
25. Id. § 13.
26. Among the instructions to the Mecklenburg County delegation to the Provincial Con-
gress are to be found the following:
16. You shall endeavour that all Treasurers and Secretaries for this State shall be ap-
pointed by the General Assembly.
17. You shall endeavour that all Judges of the Court of Equity, Judges of the Court of
Appeals and Writs of Error and all Judges of the Superior Courts shall be appointed by
the General Assembly and hold their office during one year.
10 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 870d (W. Saunders ed. 1890).
' This legislative predominance reflected an aversion to the executive supremacy of colonial
days. H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, NORTH CAROLINA: THE HISTORY OF A SOUTHERN STATE 210
(3d ed. 1973).
27. The extensive amendments to the constitution made in 1835 first provided for the direct
election of the Governor by the voters. N.C. Const. of 1776, amend. art. II, § 1 (1835).
28. Students of American constitutional history have observed a similar understanding of
fundamental principles on the part of other drafters of early constitutions:
The bitter rivalry between governors and assemblies in colonial times had instilled
in the people a deep distrust of the executive, and the [first state] constitutions reflected
this .... Under most of the state constitutions the governor was elected by the assem-
bly and was intended to be its creature .... Even the appointive power, by long tradi-
tion an executive prerogative, was often drastically impaired by provisions for
appointments by the legislature or council ....
The ascendancy of legislature over executive was in curious contrast to another pro-
vision, concerning the separation of powers. Some of the constitutions specified the dis-
tinct existence of the three principal departments of government.
A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 91-
92 (5th ed. 1976).
[T]he framers of the [first state] constitutions accepted the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers ..... But, while they accepted the theory of separation of powers, they did not in
practice establish such separation. The legislative bodies were not only made the domi-
nant branch of government, but in many cases exercised administrative or executive
functions. The legislatures appointed most of the officials in Virginia and the two Caro-
linas ....




2. North Carolina Decisional Law
The state supreme court found Wallace to be a case of first impression.
The court took the "absence of cases.which have come to this court contending
that a branch of our state government violated the separation of powers princi-
ple" to be an indication that "North Carolina, for more than 200 years, has
strictly adhered to the principle of separation of powers."'29 The court cited
only two cases, Bayard v. Singleton30 and State v. Bell,3 1 "in which members
of the judiciary have expressed themselves on the principle."3-2
Bayard v. Singleton is one of the most famous cases ever decided in North
Carolina. Sitting at New Bern in 1787, the superior court held a statute void
because contrary to the state constitution.33 Decided at a time when the rela-
tion between constitution and statute was still unclear, Bayard has been hailed
as the first reported case supporting what became another one of the funda-
mental principles of American constitutionalism, judicial review.
34
Since the principle of judicial review was not at issue in Wallace, the
court referred not to the holding in Bayard but to some expressions by Judge
Samuel Ashe that were clearly obiter dictum:
35
[A]t the time of our separation from Great Britain, we were thrown
into a similar situation with a set of people shipwrecked and cast on a
maroon'd island-without laws, without magistrates, without gov-
ernment, or any legal authority-that being thus circumstanced, the
people of this country, with a general union of sentiment, by their
delegates, met in Congress, and formed that system or those funda-
mental principles comprised in the constitution, dividing the powers
of government into separate and distinct branches, to wit: the legis-
lative, the judicial and executive, and assigning to each, several and
distinct powers, and prescribing their several limits and boundaries
36
This may be accepted as an unexceptionable statement of historical fact.
The court was wrong, however, when it described this dictum as
"[o]bviously referring to our national government. '37 The reference was to
29. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 599, 286 S.E.2d at 83-84.
30. 1 N.C. (1 Mart.) 5 (1787).
31. 184 N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190 (1922).
32. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 599, 286 S.E.2d at 84.
33. Bayard, 1 N.C. (1 Mart.) at 7.
34. B. COxE, AN ESSAY ON JUDICIAL POWER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION 68
(1893); Biggs, The Power ofthe Judiciary Over Legislation, in 17 PROCEEDINGS OF NORTH CARo-
LINA BAR ASSOCIATION 5, 10 (1915); 1 R. CONNOR, NORTH CAROLINA: REBUILDING AN AN-
CIENT COMMONWEALTH, 1584-1925, at 396 (1929); W. POWELL, NORTH CAROLINA, A
BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 85 (1977). See also A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 28, at 94.
35. With the liberty of the early reporters, Martin appended to Judge Ashe's comment the
observation: "this he said without disclosing a single sentiment upon the cause of the proceeding,
or the law introduced in support of it." 1 N.C. (I Mart.) at 6. The court in Wallace recognized
that Ashe had "deviated from the case under consideration." 304 N.C. at 599, 286 S.E.2d at 84.
36. Bayard, I N.C. (1 Mart.) at 6.
37. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 599, 286 S.E.2d at 84.
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state government instead. The words were uttered at the May term 1786.38
Although Bayard was not decided until the November term 1787, it was
opened more than a year earlier. When Judge Ashe used the quoted language,
the constitutional convention that was to draft the federal constitution had not
even been called, let alone convened.39 Once the chronology is established,
the references become clear. The "country" that separated from Great Britain
is North Carolina, not the United States. The "Congress" that established the
government is the North Carolina Provincial Congress.4° The "constitution,
dividing the powers of government into separate and distinct branches" is the
North Carolina Constitution of 1776.41 As an observation on the state's first
constitution, the dictum shows that a contemporary judge believed it embod-
ied the principle of separation of powers despite the predominance of the
legislature.
The second judicial expression on separation of powers quoted by the
court in Wallace is from Judge W. P. Stacy's dissent in State v. Bell.42 Judge
Stacy was not dissenting from a holding expressly involving separation of
powers; Bell was instead a case concerning the proper interpretation of a crim-
inal statute. The majority had given what Judge Stacy viewed as a liberal
interpretation, and he dissented principally on the ground that criminal stat-
utes were to be construed strictly. Bolstering his argument about statutory
construction, Judge Stacy stigmatized liberal interpretation as judicial legisla-
tion in violation of the principle of separation of powers.43 In so doing, he
joined the long line of judges who, usually in dissenting opinions, charge
38. Bayard, 1 N.C. (1 Mart.) at 5-6.
39. In September, 1786, the Annapolis Convention issued the call for the Constitutional Con-
vention to meet in May, 1787. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, supra note 28, at 106.
40. The Provincial Congress not only drafted the constitution of 1776, it also adopted it with-
out submitting it to the people. The court in Wallace had earlier recognized this fact. 304 N.C.
596 n.2, 286 S.E.2d 82 n.2 (citing H. LEFLER & A. NEwsoME, supra note 26, at 221). It explains
Ashe's otherwise curious reference: "the people . . . by their delegates, met in Congress, and
formed that system. . . comprised in the constitution. . . ." 1 N.C. (1 Mart.) at 6. The federal
constitution, drafted by the Constitutional Convention, was adopted by conventions of the several
states. U.S. CoNsT. art. VII.
41. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 4.
42. 184 N.C. 701, 719, 115 S.E. 190, 199 (1922) (Stacy, J., dissenting).
43. We must hew to the line and let the chips fall wherever they may. And though we
may think the law ought to be otherwise, this should not blind our judgment to what it
really is. The duty oflegislation rests with another department of the Government. It is
ours only to declare the law, not to make it. Moore v. Jones, 76 N.C 189. The people of
North Carolina have ordained in their Constitution (Art. I, § 8) that the legislative, exec-
utive, and supreme judicial powers of the Government should be and ought to remain
forever separate and distinct from each other. Such is their expressed will, and from the
earliest period in our history they have endeavored with sedulous care to guard this great
principle of the separation of the powers. In this country those who make the laws deter-
mine their expediency and wisdom, but they do not administer them. The chief magis-
trate who executes them is not allowed to judge them. To another tribunal is given the
authority to pass upon their validity and constitutionality, "to the end that it be a govern-
ment of laws and not of men." From this unique political division results our elaborate
system of checks and balances-a complication and refinement which repudiates all he-
reditary tendencies and makes the law supreme. In short, it is one of the distinct Ameri-
can contributions to the science of government ....
Wallace, 304 N.C. at 600-01, 286 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting State v. Bell, 184 N.C. at 719, 115 S.E. at
199). In the passage quoted, the last five sentences are repeated almost verbatim from Judge
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judges who have reached a different conclusion with exceeding the limits of
judicial power.44 This forensic commonplace does nothing to better the un-
derstanding of separation of powers.
Notwithstanding the asserted absence of cases involving a separation of
powers claim, the North Carolina Reports contain numerous such cases, some
of them quite recent.4 5 In particular, the delegation of legislative authority to
administrative agencies has provoked several recent cases raising the constitu-
tional issue. In 1978 the court observed:
Article I, section 6 of the North Carolina Constitution provides
that the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government
"ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other." Legisla-
tive power is vested in the General Assembly by Article II, section 1
of the Constitution. It is obvious that if interpreted literally the Con-
stitution would absolutely preclude any delegation of legislative
power. However, it has long been recognized by this Court that the
problems which a modem legislature must confront are of such com-
plexity that strict adherence to ideal notions of the non-delegation
doctrine would unduly hamper the General Assembly in the exercise
of its constitutionally vested powers.
46
Although the General Assembly may not delegate its supreme legislative
power to an agency, it may constitutionally delegate a limited portion of its
power over some specific subject matter if it prescribes adequate guiding
Stacy's majority opinion in Long v. Watts, 183 N.C. 99, 103-04, 110 S.E. 765, 767 (1922). Com-
pare the above with MAss. CONST. of 1780, part 1, art. 30:
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise
the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise
the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial shall never exercise
the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a govern-
ment of laws and not of men.
44. For a striking statement of the same theme by a distinguished contemporary of Judge
Stacy, see Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 534 (1924) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) ("an
exercise of the powers of a super-legislature-not the performance of the constitutional function
of judicial review").
45. See, e.g., In re The Broad & Gales Creek Community Ass'n, 300 N.C. 267, 266 S.E.2d
645 (1980) (statute delegating legislative power to Department of Natural Resources and Commu-
nity Development not violative of separation of powers because adequate guiding standards pro-
vided); Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249
S.E.2d 402 (1978) (statute delegating legislative power to Coastal Resources Commission not vio-
lative of separation of powers because adequate guiding standards provided); Jernigan v. North
Carolina, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E.2d 259 (1971) (statute granting judicial power to Board of Paroles
not violative of separation of powers); State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276
N.C. 576, 174 S.E.2d 551 (1970) (statute delegating legislative power to Authority not violative of
separation of powers because sufficient legislative standards implicit); North Carolina Turnpike
Auth. v. Pine Island, Inc., 265 N.C. 109, 143 S.E.2d 319 (1965) (statute delegating legislative power
to Authority not violative of separation of powers because sufficient guiding standards provided);
Cox v. City of Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252 (1940) (exercise of quasi-judicial and adminis-
trative functions by Housing Authority created under state law not violative of separation of
powers).
46. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. at 696-97,
249 S.E.2d at 410. N.C. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 6 provides that the powers "shall be" forever
separate and distinct from each other. The court in Adams is actually quoting the superseded
N.C. CO ST. of 1868, art. I, § 8. For the separation of powers clause in each successive North
Carolina Constitution, see supra note 12.
1983]
NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW
standards. 4 7
Thus, the argument in favor of the result in Wallace based on North Car-
olina decisions is incomplete. In addition to the dictum and dissenting opin-
ion cited by the court, there are cases on the delegation of legislative power
that are relevant. They indicate that the principle of separation of powers has
not been strictly adhered to; instead, reasonable exceptions have been made in
consideration of the complex problems dealt with by modem government. At
issue in Wallace was whether another exception should be carved out in favor
of legislative members of administrative agencies.
B. Decisional Law of Other States and of the United States
4 8
The second factor considered by the court in reaching its decision in Wal-
lace was foreign decisional law. Such law should be relevant only insofar as
the litigated facts are similar and the judicial reasoning is persuasive. The
North Carolina trial judge who found no violation of separation of powers
was influenced by the reasoning in cases from South Carolina 49 and Kansas
50
as well as in one federal case.51 The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected
the state cases, finding that "South Carolina and Kansas have deviated from
the separation of powers principle."'52 Instead, it preferred decisions from In-
diana,53 West Virginia,54 Georgia,5   and Colorado.5 6  In addition, the
supreme court cited four other decisions57 and two advisory opinions;58 it ad-
verted briefly to one federal case.
5 9
1. Decisional Law of Other States
Neither the trial judge nor the supreme court quoted the constitutional
47. In re The Broad & Gales Creek Community Ass'n, 300 N.C. 267, 266 S.E.2d 645 (1980)
Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402
(1978); State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 174 S.E.2d 551 (1970);
North Carolina Turnpike Auth. v. Pine Island, Inc., 265 N.C. 109, 143 S.E.2d 319 (1965); Cox v.
City of Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252 (1940).
48. As shown in a recent article, problems concerning separation of powers arise in countries
other than the United States. Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and
the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 363 (1982).
49. State ex rel McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977). See also Guidry v.
Roberts, 335 So.2d 438 (La. 1976), which is to the same effect asMcLeod, but not cited in Wallace.
50. State ex rel Schneider v. Bennet, 219 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786 (1976). Although not cited
by the North Carolina courts, an Advisory Opinion by the Supreme Court of Delaware relied
extensively on Schneider. Opinion of the Justices, 380 A.2d 109 (Del. 1977).
51. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
52. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 604, 286 S.E.2d at 85.
53. Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E. 2d 273 (1958).
54. State ex rel State Bldg. Comm'n v. Bailey, 151 W. Va. 79, 150 S.E.2d 449 (1966).
55. Greer v. Georgia, 233 Ga. 667, 212 S.E.2d 836 (1975).
56. Stockman v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912).
57. Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1976); Ahearn v. Bailey, 104 Ariz. 250, 451
P.2d 30 (1969); Township of Dearborn v. Dail, 334 Mich. 673, 55 N.W.2d 201 (1952); State ex rel.
Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973).
58. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1973); In re Opinion of the
Justices to the Governor, 369 Mass. 990, 341 N.E.2d 254 (1976).
59. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
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provisions construed in the decisions from other states. Failure to compare the
foreign constitutions with North Carolina's lessens the persuasiveness of these
citations. In the following discussion, the separation of powers clause involved
in each case will be set out first.
(a) South Carolina
In the government of this State, the legislative, executive, and judi-
cial powers of the government shall be forever separate and distinct
from each other, and no person or persons exercising the functions of
one of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any
other.
60
State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards61 was an original action in the South
Carolina Supreme Court in which the Attorney General attacked the constitu-
tionality of legislation creating the State Budget and Control Board. The
Board was composed of the Governor, the State Treasurer, the Comptroller
General, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and the Chairman
of the House Ways and Means Committee. The Board was "an executive
body dealing primarily with the fiscal affairs of the State government. ' 62 The
legislation was challenged as violating the separation of powers clause set out
above.63 The court noted that the constitutionality of the Board had been
sustained in previous cases 64 against attacks alleging violation of the dual of-
fice holding provision 65 and the separation of powers clause;66 it further noted
that subsequent to those decisions the article of the state constitution contain-
ing the separation of powers clause had been rewritten but the language on
that point had been retained unchanged. The court held that ratification of
the rewritten article implied adoption of the prior judicial construction.67 Ex-
60. S. C. CONST. art. I, §8.
61. 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977).
62. Id. at 78, 236 S.E.2d at 406-07.
63. There was also a contention that the Board was an unconstitutional invasion of the exec-
utive power confided to the Governor by S.C. CONST. art. IV, §1. The court rejected this argu-
ment, finding that the composition of the Board did not limit the Governor's powers. McLeod,
269 S.C. at 84, 236 S.E.2d at 409.
64. Mins v. McNair, 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E.2d 355 (1969); Elliott v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 156
S.E.2d 421 (1967).
65. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. II, § 2:
Every qualified elector shall be eligible to any office to be voted for, unless disqualified
by age, as prescribed in this Constitution. But no person shall hold two offices of honor
or profit at the same time: Provided, that any person holding another office may at the
same time be an officer in the militia or a Notary Public.
The dual office holding provision now appears in S.C. CONST. art. II, § 5. See Harper v. Schooler,
258 S.C. 486, 189 S.E.2d 284 (1972).
66. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. I, § 14 (now S.C. Const. art. I, § 8).
67. It is uncertain whether the holding in McLeod extends to administrative agencies other
than the State Budget and Control Board. See Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer Dist., 211
S.C. 77, 44 S.E.2d 88 (1947) (invalidating an act that established a board to supervise the erection
and maintenance of an auditorium because the board included a state senator and representative).
Subsequent to the decision in McLeod the South Carolina Supreme Court held that delega-
tion of legislative power to a portion of the legislature violates separation of powers. Aiken
County Bd. of Educ. v. Knotts, 274 S.C. 144, 262 S.E.2d 14 (1980).
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plaining the prior interpretation, the court emphasized the facts that the legis-
lators were in a minority on the Board and that their presence represented "a
cooperative effort by making available to the executive department the special
knowledge and expertise of the chairman [sic] of the two finance committees
in the fiscal affairs of the State and the legislative process in general."
68
(b) Kansas
[No distinct separation of powers clause]
State ex rel Schneider v. Bennett69 was an action of quo warranto brought
by the Attorney General to prevent legislators serving on the State Finance
Council from exercising various powers conferred by statute. The Council
was composed of the Governor, the President pro tempore of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chairman of the Senate Ways
and Means Committee, the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, the Majority Floor Leader of the Senate, the Minority Floor Leader of
the Senate, the Majority Floor Leader of the House, and the Minority Floor
Leader of the House. The Council was vested with a wide array of powers,
70
including supervision of the operations of the Department of Administration,
authority to make allocations from the State Emergency Fund and to borrow
money for short terms on behalf of the state, and authority to transfer and
expend state money. The legislation conferring these powers was challenged
as violating separation of powers and as an unconstitutional delegation of leg-
68. McLeod, 269 S.C. at 83, 236 S.E.2d at 409.
69. 219 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786 (1976).
70. The court listed some of these powers as follows:
(1) The power to fix or approve the compensation paid to state officers and employees;
(2) Certain powers under the civil service act, such as the adoption of rules and regula-
tions for carrying out the act, approval of assignment of positions in the civil service to
classes, and the assignment of classes to salary ranges, approval of the pay plan contain-
ing a schedule of salary and wage ranges and steps, approval of terms upon which state
agencies may furnish housing, food service and other employee maintenance to state
officers and employees in the civil service, and the determination of the cost and value of
such benefits;
(3) The determination of appeals by state agencies from actions by the secretary of ad-
ministration in the allotment of the general fund or special revenue funds when insuffi-
cient to cover appropriations from such funds;
(4) Determination of the amount, not less than 25 cents, to be credited by the secretary
of corrections to inmates for employment;
(5) Resolution of disputes between the director of architectural services and the head of
a state agency over construction of buildings, major repairs, or improvements authorized
by the legislature for the state agency;
(6) Setting of limitations on payment of moving expenses of state employees;
(7) Approval of rules and regulations governing operations of the department of admin-
istration and each of its divisions;
(8) Determination of appeals by state agencies from decisions of the secretary of admin-
istration or director of computer services;
(9) Approval of rules and regulations to carry out the uniform standard code for mobile
homes and recreational vehicles;
(10) Approval of the transfer by a state agency of a part of an appropriated item to any
other item of its appropriation.
Id. at 297-98, 547 P.2d at 797.
[Vol. 62
SEPARATION OF POWERS
islative powers without adequate guidelines. Although the Kansas Constitu-
tion, like the United States Constitution, lacks an express provision mandating
the separation of powers, the Kansas Supreme Court found the principle to be
implicit in the state constitution. Nonetheless, the court was of the opinion
that "individual members of the legislature may serve on administrative
boards or commissions where such service falls in the realm of cooperation on
the part of the legislature and there is no attempt to usurp functions of the
executive department of the government."'7 ' After examining the particular
duties involved, the court held the supervisory power over the Department of
Administration was a violation of separation of powers, but it found no such
violation with regard to the power to draw on the Emergency Fund and to
borrow, since the latter actions could be taken only by unanimous vote of the
Council, of which the Governor was a member. The powers to transfer and
expend money were held to be unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative
powers without adequate guidelines.
72
(c) Indiana
The powers of the Government are divided into three separate de-
partments; the Legislative, the Executive including the Administra-
tive, and the Judicial; and no person, charged with official duties
under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of
another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided.
73
Book v. State Office Building Commission74 was a taxpayer's action to en-
join members of the Commission from proceeding further with the construc-
tion of a State Office Building.75 The membership of the Commission
included the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the members of the State
Budget Committee, one member of the Senate appointed by the Lieutenant
Governor, and one member of the House appointed by the Speaker. Since all
the members of the State Budget Committee except the Budget Director were
also members of the General Assembly, legislators constituted a majority of
the Commission. The legislation creating the Commission was challenged as
violating various provisions of the Indiana Constitution, including the dual
71. Id, at 290, 547 P.2d at 792, quoted with disapproval in Wallace, 304 N.C. at 606, 286
S.E.2d at 87. For a subsequent Kansas decision finding no usurpation, see Parcell v. Kansas, 228
Kan. 794, 620 P.2d 834 (1980) (majority of members of Governmental Ethics Comm'n appointed
by legislative leadership).
72. In a subsequent case, with the same caption as the principal case, various fiscal powers of
the State Finance Council were held not to violate separation of powers. State ex re. Schneider v.
Bennett, 222 Kan. 11, 564 P.2d 1281 (1977).
73. IND. CONsT. art. III, § I.
74. 238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E.2d 273 (1958).
75. The Court described the duties of the State Office Building Commission as follows:
[T]o acquire a site within the City of Indianapolis, Indiana, and to construct and erect
thereon with all necessary equipment, a State Office Building suitable and adequate to
house the offices of the various departments and agencies of the State Government ....
to issue and sell interest bearing State Office Building revenue debentures, and. . . to
enter into appropriate agreements with the various State departments and agencies for
the use and occupancy of such building.
.d. at 131, 149 N.E.2d at 279.
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office holding provision 76 and the separation of powers clause set out above.
The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the claim of unconstitutional dual office
holding because the provision applies to "lucrative" offices and the Commis-
sioners receive only reimbursement of expenses. But the court held that the
presence of legislators on a commission with executive or administrative duties
violated separation of powers.
(d) West Virginia
The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate
and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers properly be-
longing to either of the others; nor shall any person exercise the pow-
ers of more than one of them at the same time, except that justices of
the peace shall be eligible to the legislature.
77
State ex rel State Building Commission v. Bailey 78 was an original action
in the Supreme Court of West Virginia for a writ of mandamus to require the
Secretary of State to validate a bond certificate issued on the order of the State
Building Commission. The Secretary of State had refused on the ground that
the Commission included legislators in violation of the state constitution's sep-
aration of powers clause. The Commission was composed of the Governor,
the Attorney General, the Treasurer, the Auditor, the Commissioner of Agri-
culture, the Secretary of State, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House, the Minority Leader of the Senate, and the Minority Leader of the
House. The Commission was "to provide for the construction of buildings for
specified purposes and to provide for the payment of the designated projects
by the issuance and sale of the bonds authorized by the statute. ' 79 Relying
heavily on Book, the court found the membership of legislators to be unconsti-
tutional but upheld the constitutionality of the Commission stripped of the
legislative members and issued the writ.
(e) Georgia
The legislative, judicial and executive powers shall forever remain
separate and distinct; and no person discharging the duties of one
shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the others
except as herein provided.
80
76. IND. CONST. art. II, § 9:
Effect of holding lucrative offices. No person holding a lucrative office or appointment
under the United States or under this State, shall be eligible to a seat in the General
Assembly; nor shall any person hold more than one lucrative office at the same time,
except as in this Constitution expressly permitted: Provided, that offices in the militia to
which there is attached no annual salary, and the office of Deputy Postmaster where the
compensation does not exceed ninety dollars per annum, shall not be deemed lucrative:
And provided, also, that counties containing less than one thousand polls, may confer
the office of Clerk, Recorder, and Auditor, or any two of said offices, upon the same
person.
77. W. VA. CONST. art. V, §1.
78. 151 W. Va. 79, 150 S.E.2d 449 (1966).
79. Id. at 83, 150 S.E.2d at 452.
80. GA. CONsT. art. I, § 2, 3.
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Greer v. State8' was an action challenging the constitutionality of the leg-
islation creating the World Congress Center Authority. The governing body
of the Authority consisted of twenty members, six of whom were also members
of the General Assembly. The Authority was "to plan, construct, erect, ac-
quire, own, repair, remodel, maintain, add to, extend, improve, equip, operate,
and manage" the Center.82 Quoting from Bailey, the Georgia Supreme Court
held that the membership of legislators on an executive Authority violated the
separation of powers clause set out above.
(f) Colorado
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no
person, or collection of persons, charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any
power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted.
8 3
Stockman v. Leddy84 was an action in mandamus to compel the State
Auditor to pay for services rendered to a joint legislative committee. The Au-
ditor questioned the constitutionality of the committee which was empowered
to conduct an investigation and to take action to protect the State's property.
The Colorado Supreme Court found the legislation an attempt to confer exec-
utive power on a small group of legislators and held it unconstitutional under
the separation of powers clause.
2. Federal Decisional Law
Although the United States Constitution contains no distinct separation
of powers clause, it has been recognized from the beginning as an embodiment
of that principle.85 Because constitutional litigation in the first century of the
Republic rarely raised the abstract issue of separation of powers but concerned
instead the interpretation of specific provisions, little decisional law accumu-
lated on the point. Not until the advent of the administrative agency with
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers was the United States Supreme
Court forced to confront the issue. The Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), created in 1887, was the first permanent administrative agency, and the
cases involving the ICC during the first three decades of its existence reveal a
cautious acceptance of this departure from the principle of separation of
81. 233 Ga. 667, 212 S.E.2d 836 (1975).
82. Id. at 667, 212 S.E.2d at 837.
83. COLO. CONST. art. III.
84. 55 Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912).
85. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47 & 48 (J. Madison). A decade ago Arthur Selwyn Miller chal-
lenged the conventional wisdom that the drafters of the federal constitution separated the powers
of government to reduce temptations for erring mortals; instead, Miller argued, the Founding
Fathers were seeking greater efficiency in government. Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of the
Intentions of the Founding Fathers, With Special Emphasis Upon the Doctrine of Separation of
Powers, 27 ARK. L. REv. 583 (1973).
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6
Nonetheless, the Court has periodically reaffirmed the principle, as in
1933 in O'Donoghue v. United States,87 an opinion quoted by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in Wallace.8 8 In 1976, however, in Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services89 the United States Supreme Court adopted with explicit
reference to O'Donoghue a "more pragmatic, flexible approach ' 90 and rejected
an "archaic view of the separation of powers as requiring three airtight depart-
ments of government." 9 1 In formulating a test for the violation of the princi-
ple of separation of powers, the Court declared that the "proper inquiry
focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accom-
plishing its constitutionally assigned functions."' 92 Even if there is potential
for disruption, separation of powers is not necessarily violated because the
Court must then determine "whether that impact is justified by an overriding
need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress."
93
3. Conclusions
The review of foreign decisional law permits few firm conclusions. Fed-
eral authority is certainly more permissive than the North Carolina Supreme
Court recognized. State decisions are divided, although a majority of state
courts did find violations of separation of powers in somewhat similar circum-
stances. The persuasiveness of the state decisions is weakened, however, by
the dissimilarity of the various constitutions. All the constitutional provisions
expressly requiring separation of powers include a clause similar to that in the
South Carolina Constitution: "and no person or persons exercising the func-
86. United States v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 234 U.S. 476 (1914) (statute granting rate-fixing
power to ICC not unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority); Interstate Commerce
Comm'n v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 218 U.S. 88 (1910) (rate-fixing order not beyond power of
ICC); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. 452 (1910) (narrow scope of
review of ICC orders); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 206 U.S. 441 (1907)
(no de novo investigation of facts on appeal from ICC order); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v.
Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144 (1897) (judicial review of facts upon which ICC orders were
based not prohibited by statute); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac.
Ry., 167 U.S. 479, 501 (1897) (power granted to ICC "partly judicial, partly executive and admin-
istrative, but not legislative"); Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,
162 U.S. 184 (1896) (ICC not empowered to fix rates).
87. 289 U.S. 516, 551 (1933) (statute reducing salaries and pensions of judges not applicable
to judges of District of Columbia courts).
88. 304 N.C. at 604, 286 S.E.2d at 86 (quoting O'Donahue, 289 U.S. at 530): "This separation
is not merely a matter of convenience or of governmental mechanism. Its object is basic and vital,
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201, namely, to preclude a commingling of these
essentially different powers of government in the same hands."
89. 433 U.S. 425, 441-46 (1976) (statute directing Administrator to take custody of presiden-
tial materials not violative of separation of powers).
90. Id at 442. See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974).
91. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Serv., 408 F.Supp. 321, 342 (D.D.C. 1976)).
92. Id.
93. Id. For an argument that this standard should be generalized, see Note, Fallen Angels,
Separation of Powers, and the Saturday Night Massacre: An Examination of the Practical, Consti.
tutional, and Political Tensions in the Special Prosecutor Provisions ofthe Ethics in Government Act,
49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 113 (1982).
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tions of one of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any
other." 94 At issue in Wallace was whether the North Carolina Constitution,
which lacks such a clause, should be interpreted to include it by implication.
To assume as much and then to cite as support decisions interpreting constitu-
tions containing the clause was to commit the logical fallacy known aspetitio
principii, in which what is to be proved is implicitly taken for granted.
The persuasiveness of the state decisions finding violations of separation
of powers is further weakened because the functions of many of the challenged
bodies were exclusively executive. Three of the decisions95 involved commis-
sions to construct state buildings, a function not related to rule-making. In
these cases the invasion of executive power was clear. The less executive the
functions, however, the less clear would be the violation of separation of
powers.
C. Statutory Duties of the EMC
In addition to history and precedent the court in Wallace considered the
specific provisions of the statutes involved. "It is crystal clear to us," an-
nounced the Justices, "that the duties of the EMC are administrative or execu-
tive in character and have no relation to the function of the legislative branch
of government, which is to make laws."96 In support of this conclusion the
court reviewed some of the duties imposed on the EMC by statute. Quoting
the legislation creating the EMC, the court discerned the purpose it was meant
to serve: "There is hereby created the Environmental Management Commis-
sion of the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development
with the power and duty to promulgate rules and regulations to be followed in
the protection, preservation, and enhancement of the water and air resources
of the State."
'97
There can be no question that the EMC is organizationally within the
executive branch of state government. It is part of an executive department.
Until 1979 the Governor appointed all the members of the EMC; even under
the legislation declared invalid in Wallace, the Governor would have ap-
94. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
95. Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E.2d 273 (1958); State ex rel.
State Bldg. Comm'n v. Bailey, 151 W. Va. 79, 150 S.E.2d 449 (1966); Greer v. State, 233 Ga. 667,
212 S.E.2d 836 (1975).
96. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 88. The trial judge had come to a different
conclusion. Among the "findings of fact" he listed: "3. The Environmental Management Com-
mission is a quasi-independent State regulatory agency, a part of the executive branch whose
functions include, but are not limited to, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers and duties as
generally enumerated in G.S. 143 B-282. See also G.S. 143-215.3 and .4." State ex rel. Wallace v.
Bone, Nos. 81CVS1191 & 81CVS1192, unpublished op. at 2 (Wake Co. Super. Ct. March 18,
1981).
The parties had previously agreed to a pre-trial order containing the following undisputed
fact: "1. The Environmental Management Commission is a quasi-independent regulatory agency
of the State with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers and duties as enumerated in G.S. 143
B-282." Wallace, 304 N.C. at 593, 286 S.E.2d at 80.
97. 304 N.C. at 607, 286 S.E.2d at 88 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §143 B-282 (1978)) (emphasis
added by author).
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pointed a majority of the members. Furthermore, the EMC has duties that
commonly belong to the executive branch in modem administration. Among
other things, it is empowered pursuant to statutes:98 to grant permits with re-
gard to controlling sources of air and water pollution;99 to issue special orders
to any person whom it finds responsible for water or air pollution;t°° to con-
duct investigations or direct that investigations be conducted;' 0 ' to conduct
public hearings, institute actions in superior court, and agree upon settle-
ments; 10 2 to review local air pollution control programs;103 to declare an emer-
gency when it finds a generalized dangerous condition of water or air
pollution;' °4 to grant permits for water use within capacity use areas; 10 5 to
approve all applications for dam construction; 106 to supervise the maintenance
of dams; 10 7 and to have jurisdiction over oil pollution.108
As the court recognized, the EMC has other duties as well. It is empow-
ered "to establish standards and adopt rules and regulations"' 1 9 for air quali-
ty standards, emission control standards, and classifications for air
contaminant sources;' 10 for water quality standards and classifications;' for
reporting on water and air quality;"12 for capacity use areas; 113 for the issu-
ance of permits for water use within capacity use areas; 4 for protection from
oil pollution.1 5 The power to issue rules with the effect of law is today recog-
nized as quasi-legislative, although the supreme court denied that characteri-
zation in Wallace.
Unmentioned in Wallace were the powers of the EMC to conduct hear-
ings, receive evidence, and hand down decisions with the effect of court orders;
powers usually recognized as quasi-judicial. The EMC is empowered to desig-
nate hearing officers' 16 and conduct public hearings,"17 after notice,118 at
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-282(I) (1983). In the exercise of these powers the EMC is lim-
ited by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.9 (1983).
99. Id. §§ 143-215.1 & 143-215.108.
100. Id. §§ 143-215.2(b) & 143-215.110.
101. Id. §§ 143-215.3, 143-215.19, 143-215.108(b)(5).
102. Id. § 143-215.3.
103. Id. § 143-215.311 & 143-215.112.
104. Id. § 143-215.312.
105. Id. § 143-215.15.
106. Id. § 143-215.28.
107. Id. § 143-215.31.
108. Id. §§ 143-215.75 to 143-215.102. In its opinion the Court misreads the statute as provid-
ig the EMC jurisdiction over "all" pollution, rather than "oil" pollution. Wallace, 304 N.C. at
607, 286 S.E.2d at 88.
109. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-282(2) (1983).
110. Id. § 143-215.107.
111. Id. §§ 143-214.1 & 143-215.
112. Id. § 143-215.68.
113. Id. § 143-214.14.
114. Id. § 143-215.20.
115. Id. §§ 143-215.75 to 143-215.102.
116. Id. § 143-215.4(e).
117. Id. § 143-215.4(d)(2).
118. Id. § 143-215.4(d)(1).
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which oaths may be administered, 1 9 and of which a complete record must be
kept by a reporter.' 20 The hearings "follow generally the procedures applica-
ble in civil actions in the superior court insofar as practicable, including rules
and procedures with regard to the taking and use of depositions, the making
and use of stipulations, and the entering into of agreed settlements and consent
orders."'12 1 Subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum may be issued, and state
officers are directed to follow the same procedures with regard to them "as if
issued by a court of record."' 122 Enforcement procedures include, in addition
to criminal penalties 123 and injunctive relief 124 ordered by a court, civil penal-
ties up to $10,000 assessed by the EMC itself.
12 5
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the EMC is an administrative
agency with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. As the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has recognized, administrative agencies are incompatible
with strict adherence to separation of powers.' 26 Nonetheless, they are consti-
tutional as long as adequate guiding standards are provided. 127 It may be pre-
sumed that the EMC is constitutional even though its duties do have a relation
to the function of the legislative branch because adequate statutory guidelines
are present. By not recognizing the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial char-
acter of the EMC, the Wallace court failed to address the more important issue
of whether the General Assembly may appoint legislators to serve on these
otherwise constitutional agencies.
II. ADVISORY OPINION IN AE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Within days of the decision in Wallace, the Governor, Lieutenant Gover-
nor, and Speaker of the House of Representatives requested an advisory opin-
ion from the Justices of the Supreme Court 128 about the constitutionality in
light of Wallace of two statutes enacted in 1981. The first statute related to
119. Id. § 143-215.4(d)(2).
120. Id. § 143-215.4(d)(3).
121. Id. § 143-215.4(d)(4).
122. Id. § 143-215.4(d)(5).
123. Id. § 143-215.6(b).
124. Id. § 143-215.6(c).
125. Id. § 143-215.6(a).
126. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 696-97,
249 S.E.2d 402, 410-11 (1978). See supra text accompanying note 46.
127. In re The Broad & Gales Creek Community Assn, 300 N.C. 267, 266 S.E.2d 645 (1980);
Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402
(1978); State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 174 S.E.2d 551 (1970);
North Carolina Turnpike Auth. v. Pine Island, Inc., 265 N.C. 109, 143 S.E.2d 319 (1965); Cox v.
City of Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252 (1940).
128. The Advisory Opinion has been defined as:
[A]n opinion rendered by the highest judicial officers in the state, acting as individuals
and not in a judicial capacity, in response to a request for information as to the state of
the law or counsel as to the constitutionality of proposed action, coming from the legisla-
tive or executive branches of the government.
Edsall, The ,4dvisory Opinion in North Carolina, 27 N.C.L. REv. 297, 297 (1949) (quoting A. El-
lingwood).
The judges of only a small minority of American states give advisory opinions; of those that
do, most are acting pursuant to authorization in the state constitution or a state statute. Id. at 299
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transfers within the state budget; 129 the second related to federal block
grants.13
0
The General Assembly is, of course, responsible for enacting the state
budget. No revenue may be raised or state money expended except pursuant
to an act of the legislature.' 31 Since 1929, however, the Governor in his capac-
ity as Director of the Budget' 32 has been authorized to permit "[tiransfers or
changes as between objects and items" in the appropriations for the various
spending agencies of the state.133 In 1981 the General Assembly restricted
that authorization by enacting the following statute:
[N]o requested transfer or change from a program line item may be
made if the total amount transferred from that line item during the
fiscal year would be more than ten percent (10%) of the amount ap-
propriated for that program line item for that fiscal year, unless the
Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations has
given its prior approval for that transfer. This restriction applies to
all State departments with a total General Fund appropriation of at
least fifty million dollars ($50,000,000). All other departments shall
apply the ten percent (10%) limitation to the summary by object line
items. No transfers or changes, regardless of amount, from salary
funds may be made without the prior approval of the Joint Legisla-
tive Commission on Governmental Operations. The Commission
must take action within 40 days of receiving a request for approval
from the Office of State Budget and Management. Transfers or
changes within the Medicaid program are exempt from this
subsection.
134
The Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations was estab-
lished in 1975 to provide for "the continuing review of operations of State
government."' 135 It is composed of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House, and twelve other members of the General Assembly. 136 The first
challenged statute, in other words, gave a commission of legislators power
n.4. Perhaps alone, the justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court render advisory opinions
without express constitutional or statutory authority. Id. at 329.
The federal judiciary have never offered advisory opinions. Ironically for present purposes,
the precedent was set in 1793 when the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court declined to answer
President George Washington's questions out of regard for separation of powers. P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM, CORRESPONDENCE OF THE JUSTICES 64-66 (2d ed. 1973).
129. Act of Oct. 10, 1981, ch. 1127, § 82, 1981 Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess.) 1654 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-23(b) (1983)).
130. Act of Oct. 10, 1981, ch. 1127, § 63, 1981 Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess.) 1651-52 (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 120-84.1 to 120-84.5) (Supp. 1981)).
131. N.C. CONsT. art. II, § 23; art. V, §7(1).
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-2 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See also N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(3).
133. Act of March 7, 1929, ch. 100, § 24, 1929 Sess. Laws 84-85 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§143-23(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
134. Act of Oct. 10, 1981, ch. 1127, § 82, 1981 Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess.) 1654 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §143-23(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
135. An Act to Provide for Continuing Review of Governmental Operations by the General
Assembly, ch. 490, 1975 Sess. Laws (1st Sess.) 498 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 120-71 to 120-
79 (1981 & Supp. 1981)).
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-74 (Supp. 1981).
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over budget transfers (of the specified magnitude) proposed to be made by the
Governor.
For years the state has received, in addition to its tax revenues, money
from various federal programs. 137 After the enactment of the fiscal 1981-83
state budget, the federal government changed the structure of federal pro-
grams and offered the several states funds in the form of block grants.' 38 The
North Carolina General Assembly responded by enacting a statute that de-
clared that "all federal block grant funds. . . shall be received by the General
Assembly." 139 Then, by the second challenged statute, the legislature created
a Joint Legislative Committee to Review Federal Block Grant Funds com-
posed of twelve legislators. That statute also provided the following:
(a) After federal block grant funds have been accepted by the
General Assembly, the Director of the Budget shall propose adminis-
tration and use of those funds. All proposals shall be submitted to
the Committee, or to the General Assembly if it is in session, for its
prior approval.
(b) None of the following actions with regard to State use of
federal block grant funds may be taken without the prior approval of
the Committee or of the General Assembly if it is in session:
(1) acceptance of federal block grants,
(2) determination of pro rata reduction procedures and
amounts for State programs,
(3) determination of distribution formulas,
(4) transfer of funds between block grants,
(5) intradepartmental transfer of block grant funds,
(6) encumbrance of anticipated block grant funds,
(7) adoption of departmental rules relating to federal block
grant funds,
(8) contracting between State departments involving block
grant funds, and
(9) any other final action affecting acceptance or use of fed-
eral block grant funds.
The Committee shall take action within 40 days of receiving a request for
approval from the Office of State Budget and Management. 14° The second
challenged statute, in other words, gave a committee of legislators (during the
recess of the General Assemby) power over actions proposed to be taken by
the Governor with respect to the administration of federal block grant funds.
In the advisory opinion the Justices advised the Governor, Lieutenant
137. See Act of May 11, 1935, ch. 479, § 2 1935 Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess.) 848 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §143-164 (1978)).
138. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CONG. & AD.
NEWS (95 Stat.) 357 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
139. Act of Oct. 10, 1981, ch. 1127, § 62, 1981 Sess. Laws (1st Sess.) 1651.
140. Act of Oct. 10, 1981, ch. 1127, § 63, 1981 Sess. Laws 1651-52 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 120-84.5 (Supp. 1981)).
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Governor, and Speaker of the House that the two statutes are unconstitu-
tional.141 For the history and meaning of separation of powers in North Caro-
lina they principally relied on Wallace. "For the sake of brevity," the Justices
said, "we will not restate all that we said in that opinion."142 Summarizing
Wallace, the Justices declared:
[tihe principle of separation of powers was clearly in the minds of the
framers of our Constitution; and. . . the people of North Carolina,
by specifically including a separation of powers provision in the orig-
inal Constitution adopted in 1776, and readopting the provision in
1868 and 1970, are firmly and explicitly committed to the
principle. 1
43
They also quoted from Wallace that "the duties of the EMC are administra-
tive or executive in character and have no relation to the function of the legis-
lative branch of government which is to make laws." 144 In addition, they
noted that another constitutional provision relative to the respective powers of
the branches, not germane in Wallace, was implicated by the statutes at issue:
The Governor shall prepare and recommend to the General Assem-
bly a comprehensive budget of the anticipated revenue and proposed
expenditures of the State for the ensuing fiscal period. The budget as
enacted by the General Assembly shall be administered by the
Governor. 145
In the opinion of the Justices, the power over budget transfers vested in a
commission of legislators by the first challenged statute "exceeds [the
power]. . . given to the legislative branch by Article II of the Constitution."1 46
They also thought the statute violated the principle of separation of powers by
encroaching on the Governor's duty to administer the budget. The court
thought the second challenged statute, involving federal block grants, violated
the principle of separation of powers insofar as it delegated legislative power
to, or conferred executive power on, a committee of legislators.47
Although the advisory opinion relies principally on Wallace, the issues
raised by the legislative-executive interaction in the budgetary process are un-
like the issue in that case. Wallace involved the membership of legislators on
an executive branch commission. Although the premise has been questioned
in this Article, the court decided that case on the assumption that the EMC
141. Advisory Opinion, 305 N.C. at 780-81, 295 S.E.2d at 596.
142. Id. at 773, 295 S.E.2d at 592.
143. Id. at 773-74, 295 S.E.2d at 592.
144. Id. at 775, 295 S.E.2d at 593 (quoting Wallace, 304 N.C. at 608, 289 S.E.2d at 88).
145. N.C. CONsT. art. III, § 5(3).
146. Advisory Opinion, 305 N.C. at 776, 295 S.E.2d at 594.
147. Although their opinion was not requested on the matter, the Justices also questioned
whether the General Assembly could provide for the receipt of block grant funds on the ground
that there is "nothing in the Constitution that authorizes the legislative branch actually to receive
funds." Id. at 779, 295 S.E.2d at 595 (emphasis in original). On the other hand, there is nothing in
the Constitution about any branch receiving funds. The role, however, seems closer to the consti-
tutional duties of the General Assembly than to those of other branches. If the power of the purse
is to be retained by the legislature, the executive should not be endowed with any funds not
approved by the legislature.
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performed no legislative functions. The commissions in question in the advi-
sory opinion, on the other hand, were authorized to exercise powers that are
indubitably legislative. There can be no doubt that the General Assembly can
deny the Governor authority to make budgetary transfers. The first issue for
the Justices was whether that power could be delegated to a commission of
legislators. Citing Wallace and the principle of separation of powers, they re-
solved that issue in the negative. Delegation of power does not, however, nec-
essarily implicate the principle of separation of powers. When a legislature
delegates its plenary power to a group of its members a constitutional issue is
raised. Only if that delegation is made to a coordinate branch of government,
however, is the issue one involving separation of powers. 48
The second issue in the advisory opinion did raise a genuine separation of
powers problem. In the view of the Justices, the General Assembly had in-
vaded the prerogative of the Governor. But that issue too could have been
resolved without referring to the general principle of separation of powers.
The North Carolina Constitution specifically charges the Governor with the
duty of administering the "budget as enacted by the General Assembly."' 149
In this area the general mandate of separation of powers is given concrete
expression in another part of the constitution.
III. CONSIDERATIONS NOT MENTIONED BY THE COURT
Based on its understanding of the history of the principle of separation of
powers in North Carolina and encouraged by its perception of strict adherence
to that principle by other states, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Wal-
lace held unconstitutional the statute adding legislative members to the EMC.
Ostensibly relying on Wallace, the Justices then advised the state's leaders that
two fiscal statutes were unconstitutional. Each premise of the court's opinion
in Wallace has been challenged. Before a conclusion may be drawn about the
value of the decision, however, it is necessary to consider several factors not
mentioned by the court.
A. Constitutional Considerations
Challenges in other states to the composition of bodies comparable to the
EMC have included charges of violation of the dual office holding provisions
148. It has recently been argued that cases of improper delegation of legislative authority to
groups of legislators do implicate the principle of separation of powers:
Separation analysis is as proper as analysis based on violation of the specific enact-
ment provisions of a constitution in cases of a legislature's granting of power exercisable
only by the whole body to a smaller group of legislators. The primary "enactment
clause" ground given for striking down such statutes is that they deprive the chief execu-
tive of the ability to exercise his veto authority. Since the veto is an executive preroga-
tive, the legislature has violated the essential separation between the branches.
Powers, Separation of Powers: The Unconstiutionality of the Arkansas Legislaiye Council, 36
ARK. L. Rav. 124, 126 n.13 (1982).
Assuming arguendo the correctness of this view, it is inapposite in North Carolina where the
Governor lacks the veto.
149. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(3).
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of the respective constitutions.1 50 And recent federal litigation has implicated
the appointments clause in a similar situation.' 51
1. Dual Office Holding
It may be contended that the proper issue in Wallace was not separation
of powers per se, but the separation of personnel. The desire to prevent the
concentration of power in the hands of one person or of a few persons is as old
as the principle of separation of powers itself. 152 To prevent the accumulation
of offices, each successive constitution of North Carolina has contained a pro-
vision against holding more than one office. 153 In pertinent part the provision
150. Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 189 S.E.2d 284 (1972), cited in State ex rel. McLeod v.
Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, 76, 236 S.E.2d 406,407 (1977) (see supra text accompanying note 65); Book
v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E.2d 273 (1958) (see supra text accompanying
note 76).
151. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
152. Instructions to the Orange County delegation to the 1776 N.C. Provincial Congress in-
cluded the following:
That no person shall be capable of acting in the exercise of any more than one of these
branches [of government] at the same time lest they should fail of being the proper
checks on each other and by their united influence become dangerous to any individual
who might oppose the ambitious designs of the persons who might be employed in such
power.
10 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 870h (W. Saunders ed. 1890), quoted in Wallace,
304 N.C. at 597-98, 286 S.E.2d at 83. See supra note 14.
The historian of the early constitutions of the Southeastern states observed that they "distin-
guished between a union or separation of powers organically and personally, for they not only
created separate organs for the departments of government but also prohibited the personnel of
any one of the departments from exercising the powers belonging to another." F. GREEN, supra
note 28, at 83.
153. N.C. CONST. of 1776:
XXVIII. That no member of the Council of State shall have a seat, either in the
Senate, or House of Commons.
XXIX. That no Judge of the Supreme Court of Law or Equity, or Judge of Admi-
ralty, shall have a seat in the Senate, House of Commons, or Council of State.
XXX. That no Secretary of this State, Attorney-General, or Clerk of any Court of
record, shall have a seat in the Senate, House of Commons, or Council of State.
XXXV. That no person in the State shall hold more than one lucrative office, at any
one time:-Provided, That no appointment in the militia, or the office of a Justice of the
Peace, shall be considered as a lucrative office.
N.C. CONST. of 1776 art. IV, § 4 (amend. 1835):
No person who shall hold any office or place of trust or profit under the United
States, or any department thereof, or under this State, or any other State or government,
shall hold or exercise any other office or place of trust or profit under the authority of this
State, or be eligible to a seat in either house of the general assembly: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall extend to officers in the militia or justices of the peace.
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. XIV, § 7:
No person shall hold more than one lucrative office under the State at the same
time: Provided, That officers in the militia, justices of the peace, commissioners of public
charities, and commissioners appointed for special purposes shall not be considered of-
ficers within the meaning of this section.
N.C. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 9:
(1) Prohibitions. It is salutary that the responsibilities of self-government be widely
shared among the citizens of the State and that the potential abuse of authority inherent
in the holding of multiple offices by an individual be avoided. Therefore, no person who
holds any office or place of trust or profit under the United States or any department
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of the 1970 constitution states: "No person shall hold concurrently. . . any
combination of elective and appointive offices or places of trust or profit, ex-
cept as the General Assembly shall provide by general law." 154 Using the
principle that the specific ought to be preferred over the general, it could be
argued that the dual office holding provision encompasses separation of pow-
ers insofar as it refers to personnel. If that argument were accepted, then the
appointing of legislators to the EMC would be constitutional and Wallace
would be wrongly decided.
2. Appointments Clause
Also arguably relevant to the issue in Wallace is the executive's appoint-
ment power. The appointments clause of the federal constitution155 was re-
cently relied upon by the United States Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo 156
to invalidate a Federal Election Commission that included two members ap-
pointed by the Speaker of the House and two members appointed by the Presi-
dent pro tempore of the Senate. 157 By the current Constitution of North
Carolina the Governor is likewise empowered to make appointments to the
executive branch: "the Governor shall nominate and by and with the advice
and consent of a majority of the Senators appoint all officers whose appoint-
ments are not otherwise provided for."' 5 8 In contrast to the interpretation of
the federal constitution, however, the corresponding section of the North Car-
olina Constitution of 1868, as amended, 59 was interpreted to mean that the
Governor's appointment power could validly be subjected to legislative provi-
sion.' 60 There was also authority under the 1868 constitution, as amended,
thereof, or under any other state or government, shall be eligible to hold any office in this
State that is filled by election by the people. No person shall hold concurrently any two
offices in this State that are filled by election of the people. No person shall hold concur-
rently any two or more appointive offices or places of trust or profit, or any combination
of elective and appointive offices or places of trust or profit, except as the General As-
sembly shall provide by general law.
(2) Exceptions. The provisions of this Section shall not prohibit any officer of the
military forces of the State or of the United States not on active duty for an extensive
period of time, any notary public, or any delegate to a Convention of the People from
holding concurrently another office or place of trust or profit under this State or the
United States or any department thereof.
154. N.C. CONsT. art. VI, § 9.
155. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2:
He [the President]. . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
156. 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
157. The Speaker and President pro tempore were to make their appointments upon the rec-
ommendations of the majority and minority leaders of the respective chambers. Neither could
appoint two members of the same political party. Appointments had to be confirmed by both
Houses of Congress. Id. at 113.
158. N.C. CONsT. art. III, § 5 (8).
159. N.C. CoNsT. of 1868, art. III, § 10 (1875).
160. State ex rel. Salisbury v. Croom, 167 N.C. 223, 83 S.E. 354 (1914).
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that the General Assembly possessed the power to fill executive offices created
by statute. 61 Until the North Carolina Supreme Court provides an authorita-
tive interpretation of the present appointments clause, it must be assumed that
it means what the previous clause was held to mean. If that assumption is
correct, a statute providing for the appointment by the legislature of members
of administrative agencies like the EMC would not be violative of the appoint-
ments clause. Wallace, it has been observed, only excludes legislators from
service on such bodies. Legislative appointees, even if they are not legislators,
may well believe their chief loyalty to be to the General Assembly rather than
to the Governor.
If the appointments clause of the current North Carolina Constitution
were given the same construction as the analogous clause of the federal consti-
tution, however, the issue in Wallace would have shifted dramatically. Rather
than centering on the permissibility of legislators' serving on administrative
agencies, the issue would have been whether the General Assembly could ap-
point any members, whether legislators or not, to an executive branch body.
By analogy to Buckley, the answer would have been in the negative.
162
B. Other Considerations
Judicial interpretation of the constitution may involve considerations of
public policy. These considerations may be openly expressed or merely im-
plied. There are hints in Wallace that the court was concerned about implica-
tions of the legislative actions that were before it for review. First, the court
may have been concerned about the implications for the executive branch. In
the course of reviewing the state's commitment to separation of powers, the
court referred to the lack of an executive veto: "ours is one of the few states, if
not the only state, in the Union that does not provide its governor with the
power to veto enactments of the legislature." 63 The implication might be that
a contrary result in Wallace would imperil the integrity of the office of the
Governor. If the General Assembly could constitutionally provide for the ap-
pointment of legislators to administrative agencies, then something akin to
parliamentary government' 64 could result. The Joint Legislative Committee
161. State ex rel Cherry v. Burns, 124 N.C. 761, 33 S.E. 136 (1899); Cunningham v. Sprinkle,
124 N.C. 638,33 S.E. 138 (1899); State Prison v. Day, 124 N.C. 362,32 S.E. 748 (1899); State ex rel
Ewart v. Jones, 116 N.C. 570, 21 S.E. 787 (1895). See also State ex rel. Osborne v. Town of
Canton, 219 N.C. 139, 13 S.E.2d 265 (1941). Counsel for plaintiff in Wallace conceded that
"fuinder North Carolina constitutional law, the legislature may amend the statutes establishing
the [EMC] to provide for the legislative branch to appoint any or all of the [EMC's] mem-
bers .... It may not, however, appoint its own members to sit on the [EMC]." Plaintiff Appel-
lants' Brief at 22, State ex rel Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982).
162. The Governor had himself appointed legislators to 45 positions on 32 bodies similar to
the EMC. Orth, Separation of Powers: An Old Doctrine Triggers a New Crisis, 5 N.C. INSIGHT,
No. 1, 36, 38 (May 1982). After the decision in Wallace, the Attorney General advised all legisla-
tors, "regardless of how or by whom appointed," to resign their appointments. Id. A decision
based on the appointments clause rather than on the principle of separation of powers would have
permitted the Governor to name legislators to executive branch bodies.
163. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 599, 286 S.E.2d at 83.
164. In a parliamentary government like Great Britain's executive power is exercised by a
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to Review Federal Block Grant Funds makes clear that this would not be a
mere argumentum ad horrendum.1
65
Second, the court may even have been concerned about the integrity of
the judicial branch. For purposes of its argument about the architecture of
separation of powers, it is understandable why the court would mention that
the judicial power is vested in the third branch. It is less understandable why
the court quoted the entire text of article IV, section 1:
The judicial power of the State shall, except as provided in Sec-
tion 3 of this Article, be vested in a Court for the Trial of Impeach-
ments and in a General Court of Justice. The General Assembly
shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power
or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate depart-
ment of the government, nor shall it establish or authorize any courts
other than as permitted by this Article.
166
Perhaps the court was concerned lest the increase of legislative power weaken
the independence of the judiciary. In this connection it may be noted that the
General Assembly in 1981 gave the Joint Legislative Commission on Govern-
mental Operations control over the expenditure of funds for judicial person-
nel.' 67 Concern about this development had been expressed in professional
circles shortly before the decision in Wallace.
16 8
If the court in Wallace were shaping its interpretation of the separation of
powers clause in response to these concerns, it may well have reasoned that the
General Assembly already possessed adequate powers to perform its constitu-
tional role. The legislature may create administrative agencies, add to or sub-
tract from their powers, or eliminate them altogether. It may alter any
administrative rule unless vested rights have accrued. Without adding its own
members to administrative agencies, it may nonetheless maintain close over-
sight. It may, of course, enact whatever budget seems appropriate. In the final
analysis, the court may have been moved by these unexpressed considerations
of what might be called constitutional morality rather than by the legal argu-
ments it ostensibly relied on.
IV. CONCLUSION
The result in Wallace is not supported by the reasons given. Conse-
cabinet composed of members of the legislature who are individually and collectively responsible
to the legislature. See W. Wilson, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 95 (1885).
A distinguished group of Americans is currently considering the possibility of recommending
that the leaders of Congress be allowed to serve in the Cabinet. Cutler & Dillon, Can We Improve
Our Constitutional System?, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1983, at 32, col. 3.
165. Of course, unless the appointments clause of the North Carolina Constitution of 1970 is
interpreted to prohibit it, the General Assembly could provide for the appointment of members of
administrative agencies by the General Assembly-as long as it appointed none of its own
members.
166. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 596, 286 S.E.2d at 82.
167. An Act to Authorize Additional Judicial Officials Throughout the State, to Increase Legal
Counsel Fees and to Provide for Other Related Matters, Act of July 10, 1981, ch. 964, § 20, 1981
N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess.) 1491. But see N.C. GEN. STAT. 7A-102(a) (1981).
168. Snepp, A Closer Bench and Bar, 32 N.C.B.A. BARNOTES, No. 7, at 4 (Nov.-Dec., 1981).
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quently, to the extent that it relies on Wallace, the advisory opinion is inade-
quately supported. The historical argument concerning separation of powers
in North Carolina is based on a partial statement of the facts. The decisions of
foreign courts are of questionable relevance. The duties of the EMC are not
stated in full. The dual office holding provision of the state constitution is
ignored'. Even if Wallace is to be understood as premised on unexpressed con-
siderations of public policy, it is doubtful that these considerations are ade-
quately vindicated by the result. While under the current interpretation of the
separation of powers clause, legislators may not serve on administrative agen-
cies, the appointments clause, as presently understood, does not preclude the
legislature from appointing its own nominees to such bodies as long as they
are not current members of the legislature.
